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1x1. STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter was originally filed by attorney Alva Harris ("Harris") on behalf of Jack Lee 
McLean ("McLean") who is now deceased and Mark J. Liponis ("Liponis"), as an accounting 
action relating to a joint venture among McLean, Liponis, and John N. Bach ("Bach") for the 
purchase of a thirty-three (33) acre parcel of land in Teton County. Bach filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging various causes of action, which causes of action by Bach's own admission 
and filing had already filed in federal court. R. Vol. I, pp. 37-62. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On February 14, 2001 Harris filed a Complaint on behalf of Jack Lee McLean (who 
verified the Complaint) and Marlc Liponis. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-17. 011 August 30, 2001, the district 
court entered an order denying Bach's motions to dismiss, motion to strike, and motion for 
sanctions. R. Vol. I, pp. 103-104. On September 20, 2001, Bach filed an Answer and 
Counterclaims (which claims by Bach's own admission and filing had been made in a federal 
lawsuit he had previously filed). R. Vol. I, pp. 37-62; 105-112. On January 3, 2005, the district 
court entered an order dismissing Jack Lee McLean (who died in December 2003) as a plaintiff 
in this action. R. Vol. I., p. 130-131. Oil July 2, 2007, Bach filed a motion for summary 
judgment. R. Vol. II., pp. 132-137. On September 11,2007 the district court entered an Opinion 
Memorandum (15 pages) and Quieting Title Judgment (5 pages) both of which were prepared in 
their entirety by Bach. R. Vol. II., pp. 207-226. Neither the Opinion Memorandum nor the 
Quieting Title Judginent were sent via mail to the attorneys of record by the clerk of the court 
until October 3,2007. R. Vol. I., pp. 221,226. 
On October 17, 2007, the undersigned counsel substituted into this case, in the place of 
Harris, as attorney of record for the Plaintiffs. R. Vol. 11, pp. 232-33. On that same date 
(October 17, 2007) the undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration per Rule 
ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure seeking reconsideration of the Court's 
September 11, 2007 Opinion Memorandum and Quieting Title Judginent. R. Vol. 11, pp. 234- 
286. 011 November 2, 2007, the undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Sanctions and 
accompanying doculnents against Bach for contacting his client (Liponis) directly. R. Vol. 11, 
pp. 303-319. On November 6, 2007, district judge Jon J. Shindurling entered an Order of Self- 
Disqualification. R. Vol. 11, pp. 322-23. On November 21, 2007, the undersigned filed a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration together with supporting affidavits. R. 
Vol. 111, pp. 324-373. On December 27,2007 district court judge Darren B. Simpson entered an 
Order of Disqualification Pursuant to Rule 40(d)(l)(E) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure per 
a motion made by Bach. R. Vol. 111, p p  386-87. On January 23, 2008 administrative judge 
Brent J. Moss assigned the present matter to Richard St. CIair, a senior district judge for further 
proceedings. R. Vol. 111, p. 388. 
On February 8, 2008, the undersigned filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and Quieting 
Title Judginent Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(G). R. Vol. 111, pp. 392-393. On February 20, 2008 senior 
district judge Richard T. St. Clair entered ail Order of Self Disqualification IRCP Rule 40 (d)(4). 
R. Vol. 111, p. 465. On April 10, 2008 an Order dated April 7, 2008 from the Idaho Supreme 
Court was entered appointing senior district judge Ted V. Wood as the judge for this matter. R. 
Vol. Ill, p. 470. On April 16, 2008 the Third Affidavit of Mark Liponis was filed in support of 
his pending motion for sanctions. R. Vol. 111, pp. 473-479. On May 23, 2008 district judge Ted 
V. Wood entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions for directly co~nmunicaling 
with a represented opposing party. R. Vol. IV, pp. 507-508. On June 2, 2008 Bach filed a 
motion to disqualify district judge Ted V. Wood with cause. R. Vol. IV, pp. 545-552. On June 
9, 2008 district judge Ted V. Wood entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify 
for Cause and Memorandum Decision on Motion to Disqualify for Cause. R. Vol. IV, pp. 554- 
568. 
On June 20, 2008 senior district judge Ted V. Wood entered: 1)  Order Denying Motion 
to Reconsider Under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) I.R.C.P.; 2)  Order Denying Motion to Change Caption; 3)  
Order Granting Motion to Vacate Quiet Title Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6); and Substitute 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 I.R.C.P. R. Vol. IV, pp. 
595-603. On July 7,2008 senior district judge Ted V. Wood entered Judgment and a Rule 54(b) 
Certificate in this matter. R. Vol. IV, pp. 606-607. Bach filed his Notice of Appeal on July 30, 
2008. R. Vol. IV, pp. 608-613. 
C. Statement of Facts 
PlaintiffIAppellant Liponis is a 50 year old physician board certified in internal medicine, 
m~ho has practiced medicine since 1985. R. Vol. 111, p. 345. Liponis currently practices medicine 
in the state of Massachusetts. Id. Liponis met Bach on the slti slopes of Grand Targhee ski 
resort during the winter of 1993-1994. R. Vol. 111, p. 346. Bach was very friendly and discussed 
with Liponis and his wife the possibility of buying land in Teton County, Idaho. Id. Bach told 
Liponis that he was an attorney and could save Liponis money by performing the legal work 
necessary to buy land in Teton County, Idaho. Id. 
Bach informed Liponis that he had found a 33 acre parcel of land in Teton County, Idaho 
that was selling for $6,000.00 per acre ($198,000.00) and that he had gotten the seller to lower 
the price down to $5,500.00 per acre ($181,500). Id. Bach informed Liponis that he and another 
investor were planning to buy the land and that if Liponis would like a 113 interest in the 
property he would need to provide $60,500.00 or 113 of $181,500. Id. Liponis paid a total of 
$60,500.00 for his 113 interest in the 33 acre parcel as evidenced by the records attached to his 
first affidavit. R. Vol. 111, pp. 346, 350, 352, 354. The closing documents from First American 
Title Company for the closing of the 33 acre parcel show that the actual sales price of the subject 
property was $61,000.00, meaning Liponis actually paid all but $500 of the entire purchase price 
of the property however was only given a 113 interest. R. Vol. 111, pp. 356-357. 
Interestingly, the First American Title Company documents show that Bach himself 
contributed no funds whatsoever to the purchase of the 33 acre parcel, however, Bach (as CEO 
of Targhee Powder Emporium, LTD) received a 113 interest in the subject property. R. Vol. 111, 
pp. 362, 363. Refund checlcs for overpayment of the property were issued to John N. Bach (in 
the amount of $590.97) and Jack Lee McLean & Jolm N. Bach (in the amount of $5,000.00). R. 
Vol. 111, pp. 359-60. Liponis has paid property taxes on the 53 acre parcel of property for the 
years, includi~lg, but not limited to, 2004,2005, and 2007. R. Vol. 111, pp. 347, 365-66. 
The September 11, 2007 Quieting Title Judgment entered in this matter purported to take 
away Liponis's 113 interest in the 33 acre parcel. Liponis did not learn about the Quieting Title 
Judgment until a telephone call on October 5,2007. R. Vol. IV, p. 539. Upon finding out that a 
quieting title judgment had been entered in this matter, Liponis contacted and retained the 
undersigned as his counsel of record. R. Vol. 111, p. 347. Liponis, through counsel, filed several 
motions and senior district judge Ted V. Wood granted Liponis's Motion to Vacate Quiet Title 
Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6) LR.C.P, entered a Substitute Order on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 I.R.C.P., and entered Judgment which withdrew and vacated 
any and all quiet title and/or injunctive relief previously granted to Bach as to the 33 acre parcel 
and also vacated the September 1 1, 2007 Quieting Title Judgment in its entirety as it related to 
this action and tile 33 acre parcel of property. R. Vol. IV, pp. 599-603,606-07. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JUNSDICTION, ACTED WITHIN THE 
BOUNDARIES OF ITS DISCRETION, AND EACIMED ITS DECHSION TO 
DENY BACPI'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FOR CAUSE THROUGH AN 
EXERCISE OF REASON. 
1. The district had jurisdiction and authority to rule on Bach's motion to disaualiii. 
for cause. 
Bach's claim that senior district judge Ted V. Wood was without jurisdiction to rule on 
his motion for disqualification with cause is without merit. On April 10, 2008 an Order dated 
April 7, 2008 and signed by Idaho Supreme Court Chief Justice Daniel T. Eismann was filed in 
this matter specifically assigning Ted V. Wood to this case. The Order states in pertinent part: 
The Court, having approved and designated TED V. WOOD to 
temporarily sit with any state court. as a senior judge pursuant to Section 1-2005, 
Idaho Code, with all of the judicial powers of a regularly qualified justice or judge 
of the courts to which he may be hereafter assigned; and 
The Court having determined that the following assignment to Senior 
Judge TED V. WOOD is reasonably necessary and will promote the efficient 
administration of justice; 
IT IS I-IEREBY ORDERED that Senior Judge TED V. WOOD be, and 
hereby is, assigned to the case set forth below for purposes of any pending matters 
and all proceedings necessary for final disposition: 
Jack Lee Mclean, et a1 v. John N. Bach 
Teton County Case No. CV-2001-033 
After Judge Wood entered rulings adverse to Bach, Bach filed a motion for 
disqualification for cause. Rule 40(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: 
"Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shail be without authority to 
act further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for disqualification." 
(Emphasis added). In compliance with said rule, Judge Wood stayed all activity in the action 
until he ruled on and denied Bach's motion for disqualification for cause. R. Vol. IV, p. 552-53. 
Therefore, there is no question that senior district judge Ted V. Wood had jurisdiction and 
authority to rule on Bach's motion to disqualify for cause. 
2. The district court was correct in its decision denving Bach's requestidelnand for 
l u a l i h  for cause 
per Idaho case law and anplicable Idaho rules of Civil Procedure. 
Next, Bach conlplains that he was deprived of an evidentiary hearing andlor oral 
argument on his motion to disqualify for cause. Notably, the district court recognized that "Bach 
did not request oral argunient within the body of his motion as provided in I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D), 
nor did he request or demand an evidentiary hearing on the motion." R. Vol. IV, p. 556. 
Nevertheless, because of a statement made in Bach's memorandum, the court treated such 
statement as a request andlor demand for an evidentiary hearing or oral argument. R. Vol. IV, p. 
557. This Court has held that there is no requirement of an evidentiary hearing prior to a district 
court's determination on a motion for disqualification for cause. This Court held in State v. 
Pratt, 128 Idaho 207,211, 912 P.2d 94,98 (1996): 
. . . [Appellant] maintains that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to 
disqualify without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. As we have said, when 
a court is faced with a motion to disqualify for bias or prejudice under I.C.R. 25 
or I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2), "the trial judge need only conclude that lie can properly 
perform the legal analysis which the law requires of him." Beam, 115 Idaho at 
215, 766 P.2d at 685. This decision is committed to the trial court's discretion 
and there exists no requirement that the court's determination must be 
preceded by an evidentiary hearing. (Emphasis added). 
To the extent Bach complains that it was improper for Judge Wood to rule on his motion 
to disqualify without oral argunient, such a contention is also without merit. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held in Lamln v. State, 143 Idaho 763,765-66, 152 P.3d 634,636-37 (Ct. App. 2006) as 
follows: 
[Appellalit] contends that notwithstanding the Pratt court's determination that an 
evidentiary hearing is not required, the district court erred in not allowing a 
hearing for presentation of oral argument on his motion. We disagree. Rule 
40(d)(2)(B) specifies that the presiding judge must grant or deny the motion 
"upon notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for motions" 
(emphasis added). The italicized language refers to the m~otice and hearing 
requirements for motions that are established in I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D). The latter 
rule prescribes the general procedures for filing and serving motions, affidavits, 
and briefs. Regarding oral argument on motions, it states: 
If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the 
motion, and does not file a brief within fourteen (14) days, the 
court may deny such motion without notice if the court deems the 
motion has no merit. If argument has been requested on any 
motion, the court may, in its discretion, deny oral argument by 
counsel by written or oral notice to all counsel before the day of 
the hearing, and the court may limit oral argument at any time. 
This rule does not support [Appellant's] contention that a hearing is mandatory on 
a motion to disqualify. Rather than requiring oral argument, it clearly provides 
that the court may limit or deny arguments. 
Therefore, consistent with the holdings of Pratt and Larnnz and the applicabIe Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court did not e n  when it denied Bach's request for an 
evidentiary hearing and/or oral argument on his motion to disqualify. 
3. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Bach's motion to 
disaualify for cause. 
Rule 40(d)(2)(A)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from 
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: 
4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or 
the case in the action. 
The granting or denial of a motion to disqualify a judge for cause is vested in the sound 
discretion ofthe trial judge. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). 
When faced with an appeal from a discretionary determination, the appellate court 
must decide: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason. 
State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207,211,912 P.2d 94,98 (1996). 
A party's vague and unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to merit disqualification 
of the district court. I-lays v Craven, 131 Idaho 761,963 P.2d 1198 (Ct. App. 1998). 
There is no question that the district court in this matter correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary and it certainly acted within the boundaries of its discretion by denying the motion. 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 554-568. There can also be no question that the district reached its determination 
in this matter through an exercise of reason. The district court entered a thirteen (13) page 
Memorandum Decision on Motion to Disqualify for Cause specifically detailing and discussing 
the rationale and setting forth applicable case law and other cited authorities for its denial of 
Bach's motion. R. Vol. IV, pp. 556-568. 
Bach has not set forth anything in his Appellant's Brief that would even suggest that the 
district court did not exercise reason in reaching its determination to deny his motion to 
disqualify for cause and has merely presented the same vague unsubstantiated allegatiolls which 
the district court correctly and concisely addressed in its Memorandum Decision on Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause. Therefore, Liponis would respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
district court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify for Cause and Memorandum 
Decision On Motion to Disqualify for Cause. 
E. THE DLSTMCT COURT HAD JUMSDICTION AND ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED LIPONIS'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
ORDER AND QUIETING TITLE JUDGMENT PER I.R.C.B. 6Q(b)(6). 
1. The district had jurisdiction and authority to rule on Liponis's motion to 
dis~ualifv for cause. 
Bach's claim that senior district judge Ted V. Wood was without jurisdiction to rule on 
Liponis's Motion to Set Aside Order and Quiet Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is without 
merit. On April 10, 2008 an Order dated April 7, 2008 and signed by Idaho Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Daniel T. Eismann was filed in this matter specifically assigning Ted V. Wood to 
this case. The Order states in pertinent part: 
The Court, having approved and designated TED V. WOOD to 
temporarily sit with any state court as a senior judge pursuant to Section 1-2005, 
Idaho Code, with all of the judicial powers of a regularly qualified justice or judge 
of the courts to which he may be hereafter assigned; and 
The Court having determined that the following assignment to Senior 
Judge TED V. WOOD is reasonably necessary and will promote the efficient 
administration of justice; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Senior Judge TED V. WOOD be, and 
hereby is, assigned to the case set forth below for purposes of any pending matters 
and all proceedings necessary for final disposition: 
Jack Lee Mclean, et a1 v. John N. Bach 
Teton County Case No. CV-2001-033 
R. Vol. 111, p. 470. 
In addition, Rule 13(b)(6) of the Ida110 Appellate Rules states: 
In civil actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the district court 
shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take 
the following actions during the pendency on an appeal: 
(6) Rule on any motion under Rule 60(a) or (b), I.R.C.P. 
In this case there was no order of the Supreme Court prohibiting the district from ruling 
upon Plaintiffs'IAppellants' I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) motion and I.A.R. 13(b)(6) specifically states 
that the district court has the power and authority to rule upon such motions. Therefore, Bach's 
contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction or authority to hear Liponis's Motion to 
Set Aside Order and Quieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is without merit. 
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Liponis's Motion Set 
Aside Order and Ouieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 
The power of a trial court to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary. Clear 
Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 559, 561 (1992). "Absent clear 
abuse of that discretion, [this Court] will not overturn the trial court's decision." Id. The abuse 
of discretion standard on appeal has been set forth above on page 8 of this brief and will not be 
recited again here. 
The district court's perception that its decision concerning whether to grant Liponis's 
Motion to Set Aside Order and Quieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) involved an 
exercise of discretion is evidenced in the district court's following statement: 
Now, again, the decision whether to grant a motion or deny relief under Rule 
6O(b) is a discretionary one. 
Tr. (Karla Steed), p. 60,11. 13-15. 
This statement establishes the district court's perception that the issue concerning 
whether to grant Liponis's Motion to Set Aside Order and Quieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(6) involved an exercise of discretion. There is also no questioil that the district court acted 
within its boundaries of discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards in granting 
Liponis's Motion to Set Aside Order and Quieting Title Judg~nent Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). The 
district court stated: 
And the courts have stated that Clause 6, that is Rule 60(b)(6), is applicable 
whenever such action is appropriate to accon~plish justice. I would refer the 
parties to the case of First Security Bank versus Stauffer at 112 Idaho, 133. 
Tr. (Karla Steed), p. 60,lI. 15-21. 
Finally, the district court reached its decision to grant Liponis's Motion to Set Aside 
Order and Quieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) through an exercise of reason. The 
complete rationale for the district court's decision is found in Karla Steed Transcript for the June 
19, 2008 hearing at pages 61-79. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the district court's rationale 
will be set forth below. 
Upon an exhaustive review of the file, the district court pointed out several salient points 
relative to the history of this litigation which it set forth at the June 19,2008 hearing: 
. . . On September 20 of 2001 Mr. Bach filed an answer and counterclaim. In the 
answer he basically denies the allegations - most of the allegations in the 
plaintiffs complaint. He then asserts an independent counterclain~. However, in 
that counterclaim he asserts no cause of action wl~atsoever for quiet title to 
any property or for temporary or permanent injunctive relief as to 01-33. 
Now, after filing his answer and counterclaim Mr. Bach, at least in my review 
of the files, has never filed an amended counterclaim alleging a right to quiet 
title to the 33-acre Drawknife property, or permanent injunctive relief in 
case 01-33. Now on July 2" of 2007 Mr. Bach filed the motion for suininary 
judgment which machination fonns the thrust of what we're talking about here 
today. Now in his motion for summary judgment, together with the motion, he 
filed a supporting affidavit and what he calls an initial brief in support of the 
motion. In the motion and the affidavit and the initial brief Ms. Baeh seeks 
only dismissal of  the complaint, that is complaints, in case 01-33, which is the 
one we're dealing with here today, and 01-265. And he makes no reference 
to or does he claim a right to a quiet titIe judgment on the 33-acre Drawknife 
property or permanent injunctive relief in 01-33. I noted in reviewing the case 
that at this time - if this was not the first time, it was the first time that I noted, he 
combined his motion and supporting documents in 01-33 with 01-265. However, 
I will note - because I think this is important - at no time, either up to the filing of 
the motion for summary judgment or thereafter to the present date, has Mr. Bach 
ever filed a motion for joinder under the applicable rules of Idaho rules of civil 
procedure, nor Ras any order granting joinder ever been entered. Now, Mr. 
Bach's first mention of quiet title and injunctive relief in 01-33 to the 33-acre 
Drawknife property is contained in his closing brief in support of the motion 
for summary judgment which was filed 011 July 30 o f  2007 which was eight 
days before the hearing was scheduled on the motion for summary judgment 
on August 7,2007. 
Tr. (Karla Steed), pp. 61-63; 11. 17-25, 1-25, 1-17 (emphasis added). 
Discussing the August 7, 2007 hearing on Bach's motion for suzninary judgment, the 
district court at the June 19, 2008 hearing states: 
In any event, the Court goes on and says on pages six and seven, I quote: But my 
concern is that these are sitting and I don't know how to get them moving. Mr. 
Harris, is there any reason I should not just dismiss these under Rule 40(b) for 
failure to prosecute? And then Mr. Harris who was present said, and I am 
quoting: No, Your Honor. Only without prejudice. Then Judge Shindurling 
responds: They will be dismissed with prejudice if I dismiss then]. You had 
opportunity to prosecute them, and you have not done so. . . . 
Then going on Mr. Bach says, and I am quoting: And the third parcel is the 33- 
acre parcel known as the Drawlcnife parcel. I set this all out in my motion. Let 
me parenthetically interject here that he did not do that. It's not true. In his 
motion for summary judgnlent he does not in 01-33 say he is entitled to quiet title 
on the Drawknife 33-acre parcel. . . . Then Judge Shindurling on page 12 
states, and I am quoting: Summary judgment will be granted for lack of  
response under Rule 56. And then he says addressing Mr. Bach: Submit to me 
your orders on summary judgment. . . . I also want to make the point that Judge 
Shindurling's ruling is general and non-specific except to say he grants the 
motion for sumrnary judgment. The only reference to what he was granting 
was in the body of the discussion earlier about the failure to prosecute under 
Rule 41. Judge Shindurling throughout the hearing made no reference 
whatsoever or ruling whatsoever that Mr. Bach was to have judgment 
quieting title to him as to the 33-acre Drawknife property or  that he was 
entitled to injunctive relief as to case 01-33. 
Tr. (Karla Steed), pp. 66, 67, 68, 69; 11. 8-19, 21-25, 1-4 and 13-17 and 25, 1-12 (emphasis 
added). 
The district court tile11 goes through a detailed analysis of the problems and errors 
contained in the September 11, 2007 Order and Quieting Title Judgment. See Tr. (Karla Steed), 
pp. 70-73; 11. 18-25, 1-25, 1-25, 1-8. The district court then moves into its ruling on granting 
Liponis's Motion to Set Aside Order and Quieting Title Judgment Per I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6): 
Now except as to Judge Shindurling's verbal ruling on August 7,2007, that 
granted Mr. Bach's motion for summary judgment by dismissing plaintiffs 
complaint with prejudice, the opinion memorandum and orders as well as 
the quieting title judgment drafted by Mr. Bach and signed unchanged by 
Judge Shindurling -- we're (sic) totally without a legal basis as to case 01-33 
because Mr. Bach did not plead a cause of action for quiet title or permanent 
injunctive relief in his counterclaim in case 01-33. In that regard, I would refer 
the parties to the case often cited by Mr. Bach and referred to here today which is 
Rexburg Lumber Company versus Purrington, 62 Idaho, at 461. A 1941 case. In 
that case the Supreme Court said that -- in their answer, the appellants did not by 
cross complaint or otherwise ask for affirmative relief which lacked the trial Court 
noted and commented on. Then it says: Title may not therefore be quieted herein 
in appellants. In other words, since the appellants had filed a cross claim, 
counterclaim, third-party claim or otherwise, seeking quiet party relief; they were 
not entitled to it. Furthermore, except as to Judge Shindurling's verbal ruling 
of August 7,2007, that did grant Mr. Bach's motion for summary judgment 
by dismissing the complaint - the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice in this 
case, 01-33; the opinion memorandum and orders as well as the quiet title 
judgment drafted by Mr. Bach and signed by Judge Shindurling were 
inconsistent with and contrary to, and or exceeded the verbal ruling of Judge 
Shindurling at the motion for summary judgment hearing which was held on 
August 7 of 2007 in case 01-33. In that regard I would refer the parties to 
Rodriguez versus Oakley Valley Stone, Inc, 120 Idaho, 370. A 1991 Idaho 
Supreme Court case. Finally, Mc Bacla's attempt in this case, 01-33, to either 
intentionally or not misiead the Court into granting quiet title and injunctive 
relief to which he was not entitted as to the 33-acre Drawknife property was 
improper and impermissible, overreaching. And in that regard I would refer 
the parties to Nopkins versus Troutner, 134 Idaho, 445. A 2000 Idaho Supreme 
Court case. So in summary what I am saying here is that Mr. Bach never did 
plead a claim for quiet title relief to the Drawknife 33-acre parcel in this case. 
And simply raising that as a matter in his final brief in support of the motion 
for summary judgment does not substitute for a properly pled claim for quiet 
title relief. Not having pled a claim for quiet title relief he is not entitled to 
quiet title relief. Had he filed a motion and obtained the Court's permission, and 
had he filed say an amended counterclaim asking for quiet title relief to the 
Drawknife 33-acre piece of property, the result would likely be different. 
Therefore, in order to accomplish justice in this case and consistent with its 
inherent powers, this Court will exercise its discretion and grant plaintiffs 
motion under Rule 60(b)6 and vacate the orders and judgment signed and 
entered by Judge Shindurling on September 11 of 2007 as to the issues of 
quiet title and permanent injunctive refief concerning, and only concerning, 
the 33-acre Drawknife property in this case, 01-33. Accordingly and 
consistent there with the opinion memorandum and orders prepared by Mr. 
Bach and signed by Judge Shindurling on September 11 of 2007 are hereby 
withdrawn and vacated in their entirety as to and only as to 01-33. And the 
quieting title judgment prepared by Mr. Bach and signed by Judge 
Shindurling on September PI, 2007 nunc pro Lunc 8707 is hereby withdrawn 
and vacated in its entirety as to this case, 01-33, and this case only. And 
finally a substitute order will be entered granting Mr. Bach's motion for suinlnary 
judgment by dismissing plaintiffs complaint with prejudice in civil case 01-33 
without awarding any quiet title or permanent injunctive relief in favor of Mr. 
Bach to the 33-acre Drawknife property. In other words, the summary judgment 
in favor of Mr. Bach dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for an accounting will be 
affirmed. And his summary judgment in that regard and in that regard only will 
stand. As to the remainder of the relief provided, that will be vacated. All right. 
Tr. (Karla Steed) pp. 75-79; 11, 8-25, 1-25, 1-25, 1-25, 1-8 (emphasis added), 
Based upon the foregoing there can be no question that the district court came to its 
decision through an exercise of reason and therefore, the district court's June 20, 2001: Order 
Granting Motion to Vacate Quiet Title Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6) I.R.C.P. and July 7, 2008 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION AND ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT ENTERED PTS JULY 7,2008 WDGMENT. 
The Judgment which the district court entered on July 7, 2008 in this inatter minors its 
rulings in its June 20, 2008 Order Granting Motion to Vacate Quiet Title Judgment Under Rule 
60(b)(6) I.R.C.P. and June 20, 2008 Substitute Order on Defendant's Motion for Sununary 
Judgment Under Rule 56 I.R.C.P. There is no question the district court had jurisdiction and 
authority to enter its Judgment of July 7, 2008. Liponis would incorporate by reference as if set 
forth in full herein section 1V.B. 1 of this brief, which sets forth the authority and reasons for why 
the district court had jurisdiction in entering orders and the judgment in this matter. 
In addition, the district court acted within its discretion by entering its July 7, 2008 
Judgment. Liponis would incorporate by reference as if set forth in full herein section IV.B.2 of 
this brief for the proposition that the district court acted within its discretion. The authorities and 
analysis set forth in section IV.B.2 of this brief would apply equally to the July 7,2008 Judgment 
as it would the June 20,2008 Order Granting Motion to Vacate Quiet Title Judgment Under Rule 
60(b)(6) I.R.C.P. because the July 7, 2008 Judgment closely minors the June 20, 2008 Order, 
therefore the rationale for the Order and Judgment would be the same. Therefore, the July 7, 
2008 Judgment entered by the district court in this inatter should be affirmed. 
D. THE DISTNCT HAD JUHSDLCTION AND ACTED WITHIIN ITS 
DISCRETION BY G ~ N T I N G  LIPONIS'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AGAINST BACK FOR BACH CONTACTING A REPRESENTED OPPOSING 
PARTY. 
1. The district had jurisdiction and authority to rule on Liponis's Motion For 
Sanctions. 
Bach's claim that senior district judge Ted V. Wood was without jurisdiction to rule on 
Liponis's Motion for Sanctions is without merit. On April 10,2008 an Order dated April 7,2008 
and signed by Idaho Supreme Court Chief Justice Daniel T. Eismaru~ was filed in this matter 
specifically assigning Ted V. Wood to this case. The Order states in pertinent part: 
The Court, having approved and designated TED V. WOOD to 
temporarily sit with any state court as a senior judge pursuant to Section 1-2005, 
Idaho Code, with all of the judicial powers of a regularly qualified justice or judge 
of the courts to which he may be hereafter assigned; and 
The Court having determined that the following assignment to Senior 
Judge TED V. WOOD is reasonably necessary and will promote the efficient 
administration of justice; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Senior Judge TED V. WOOD be, and 
hereby is, assigned to the case set forth below for purposes of any pending matters 
and all proceedings necessary for final disposition: 
Jack Lee Mclean, et a1 v. John N. Bach 
Teton County Case No. CV-2001-033 
R. Vol. 111, p. 470, 
Therefore, Bach's contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction or authority 
to hear and rule on Liponis's Motion for Sanctions is without merit. 
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Liponis's Motion 
For Sanctions. 
"What sanction should be imposed or whether a sanction should be imposed at all is 
discretionary with the trial court." State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495, 496 (1977). 
The thee-part abuse of discretion analysis utilized by this Court has been set forth previously on 
page 8 of this brief. 
It is undisputed that Bach coinmunicated with lawyer represented opposing parties 
(Liponis) on at least two occasions in this lawsuit. R. Vol. 11, pp. 308-319; R. Vol. 111, pp. 473- 
477. It is also undisputed that Bach is a disbarred attorney from California and has filed multiple 
lawsuits in both state and federal court in Idaho. Rule 4.2 of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, entitled "Communication with Person Represented by Counsel," provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject 
of the representation with a person the lawyer lcnows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "We hold that I.R.P.C. 4.2 applies to attorneys acting 
prose and that ap ro  se attorney may not communicate with the opposing party about the subject 
of the representation." Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 422, 925 P.2d 11 18, 1121 
(1996). The district court agreed that Rule 4.2 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
applied to Bach who is acting as a pro se attorney in this case, and entered its Order Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Sallctions on May 23, 2008. R. Vol. IV, pp. 507-08. Bach has submitted 
nothing that would indicate that the district court abused its discretion in granting said motion 
and therefore Liponis would respectfully request that the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Sanctions be affirmed. 
V .  CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record before the Court, cited case law precedent, and the arguments 
presented, Liponis hereby respectfully requests that this Court: 
1. Affirm the district court's June 9, 2008 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause; 
2. Affirm the district court's June 20, 2008 Order Granting Motion to Vacate Quiet 
Title Judgment Under Rule 60(h)(6) I.R.C.P.; 
3. Affirm the district court's July 7,2008 Judgment; and 
4. Affirm the district court's May 23, 2008 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Sanctions. 
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